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# Foreign Policy and the Democratic Majority

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Speech of Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana)

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# FOREIGN POLICY AND THE DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY

Mr. President:

Two weeks ago the President of the United States addressed the Congress on the state of the Union. Last week he spoke to the entire nation on the occasion of his inauguration. These statements both dealt in significant measure with the problems of war and peace. There was concern over the one. There was eloquent hope in the bright promise of the other.

It was to be expected that the President would turn his attention to these matters. The problems which confront us in our relationships with other nations are the most fundamental of our times. To say that is not to minimize the importance of domestic issues. Adequate education for our children, decent living standards for all Americans, conservation of natural resources, power development, farm income -- all these and others -- are of the greatest consequence to the people of the United States. They are issues which will occupy most of the time of the Senate during the current session. But they are issues which we shall debate not in an atmosphere of secure peace. We shall debate these issues in the ever-lengthening shadow of nuclear warfare, that unfolding science of certain human extinction.

The fact is that foreign policy, once remote, now intrudes into every aspect of our national life. It has come to exercise the most intimate influence over the welfare and the future of every man, woman and child in the United States. It has become the life and death factor of civilization in this second half of the 20th Century.

I hope that Congress, no less than the President, will give adequate attention to foreign policy during the current session. The Legislative Branch is not without Constitutional responsibilities and powers in this connection. It is to the Senate that the President must turn for advice and consent in fundamental foreign questions. It is Congress which appropriates the vast public funds to support our defense establishments. It is Congress which approves or disapproves foreign aid programs. It is Congress which provides for the Department of State and the numerous other agencies of government involved in activities abroad. It is Congress which, if circumstances were so to require, would declare war and, if circumstances were ever again to permit, make peace.

In stressing the importance of the Senate, of the Congress, in foreign relations, I have no desire to detract from the significance of the President in these matters. If our responsibilities are great, his are greater.

The President alone speaks for the entire nation in our relations with others. He alone leads us -- Republicans and Democrats alike -- in foreign policy. The President may lead well or he may lead badly. Regardless of party, however, no American can escape the consequences of his leadership.

Nor can the President abdicate his responsibilities of leadership in foreign relations. The Vice President will not serve for the purpose. No member of the Cabinet, not even the Secretary of State, can substitute. Nor can the National Security Council, or any manner or number of special Presidential commissions, committees and counselors. All these, and especially the Secretary of State, may be helpful. In the end, however, it is the President who either gives

or fails to give effective direction to the course which the nation pursues abroad. In this age of synthetics, the way has not yet been found to synthesize the Presidency of the United States.

The point I wish to make is that, under the guidance of the President, the functions of foreign policy are shared functions, shared between the Legislative and Executive Branches of the government. They can be effectively discharged only when there is leadership in the Presidency and when there is a mutual will to cooperate between the Executive Branch and Congress.

I know of no Senator on this side of the aisle who does not believe the country would be better off under a Democratic President. By the same token, however, I know of no Democratic Senator who will not sustain the President when he speaks or acts in our relations with others on behalf of the United States. Let me say then at the outset that so long as President Eisenhower leads wisely and without partisanship, he shall have the cooperation he needs from the Democratic majority in Congress.

Some may call this attitude bi-partisan or non-partisan. As for myself, I have no particular attachment to these terms. They have for too long been used by the Executive Branch to beat the drums for precipitate action in foreign relations. For too long they have served as a club to silence responsible criticism in Congress. These terms, in short, have been twisted and distorted by misuse.

I shall never be party to a bi-partisan silence when conscience requires me to speak out on foreign policy. I hope the Senate shall never subscribe to a glib bi-partisanship as a substitute for independent thought by this body.

Whatever the word we may use, however, the course which the Democratic majority will pursue in questions of foreign relations during this session is clear. It is the course of responsible cooperation. What applies to the Democratic majority ought to apply no less forcibly to the Republican minority. And with all due respect, it must also apply to the Republican President and the Republican Secretary of State.

The need for responsible cooperation places upon us all an extra measure of restraint in dealing with matters of foreign policy. It requires us -- all of us -- to lift above party the international interests of the United States. It constrains us -- all of us -- to great care in the consideration of questions which involve these international interests.

Let me say again, however, that the restraints of cooperation apply with equal force to the Republican minority and the Republican President. The Democratic majority in the Senate -- this majority of 2 votes -- cannot carry the burden alone. If there is going to be cooperation, it will have to come from all sides. If it is not forthcoming, the people of this country are capable of assessing responsibility for the failure.

We have already had one example in this session of how not to promote responsible cooperation. I refer to the President's proposed resolution on the Middle East. I shall speak frankly in the hope that we may be able to avoid in the future a repetition of this ineptitude.

The Middle Eastern proposal was a matter presumably of the highest national importance. The President believed the cooperation of Congress was

essential in handling it and has sought that cooperation. Yet his proposal was allowed to trickle out of the Executive Branch days before Congress received any official notification of it. I, myself, learned all of its details from the newspapers long before the Secretary of State gave us the same details in a secret session of the Foreign Relations Committee.

The resolution raises issues of tremendous constitutional significance. Yet we have still to determine what Congressional leaders were consulted in its formulation. We have still to determine whether they were consulted by the Executive Branch before or after parts of the press of the nation were taken into its confidence.

This resolution was presented on the basis of urgency, but what suddenly gave rise to the urgency has never been explained by the Executive Branch. Months before they erupted in the clash at Suez, the accumulating dangers in the Middle East had been noted by members of Congress in both parties and citizens outside the government. Many proposals for prompt and constructive action were made to the Administration. Throughout a long election campaign, however, the Administration permitted these dangers in the Middle East to fester in the warm promises of peace and the non-involvement of the United States. Now, the Administration has suddenly discovered that there is no peace, that there must be deep involvement and that Congress must authorize the involvement.

We are told that we face the most dangerous situation in ten years; that it is more dangerous than the Berlin blockade, than the collapse of China, than the Soviet direct threat against Western Europe, than the Hungarian crisis.

This great danger -- and let me say that I believe it is a great danger --this great danger is discovered by the Administration only a short time after the election results are in and a few days before the new Congress is scheduled to convene.

It is so great a danger that the President sees fit to intrude the matter into the orderly and established procedures of the government. It is presented to the Congress with the fanfare of crisis before the State of the Union message and before the new Congress has even had an opportunity to complete its organization.

I do not know who advised the President on this procedure. I do know that he was ill-advised. The handling of this matter by the Executive Branch -- this matter of the highest national importance -- this greatest danger in ten years -- has had all the earmarks of a blatant press agentry.

Responsible cooperation in foreign policy requires that this body give careful consideration to any proposal advanced by the President of the United States. It does not require us to pamper the public relations experts of the Administration. I am glad to note that despite the clumsiness of its introduction, the Senate is proceeding in this Middle Eastern question as it should in all matters which affect the lives and future of the people of the United States.

So far as the Democratic majority is concerned, we shall give the fullest regard to the views of the President, as he has presented them to the Congress. We shall pay the most careful attention to the evaluations of the Secretary of State and the President's other assistants, as they have been expressed at appropriate hearings.

We shall weigh these views in the light of the interests of the people of the United States, as we see those interests. We shall weigh them in the light of independent evaluations of the Middle Eastern situation as they are advanced in the press and elsewhere. We shall weigh them in the light of the personal knowledge and experience of members of this body.

We shall proceed, in short, as the Senate ought always to proceed in vital matters of foreign policy. We shall proceed in independence but with full deference for the leadership of the President. I am confident that members on the other side of the aisle will approach the question of the Middle East or any question of this kind in the same fashion.

What is the alternative? Can we do less? Can we blithely consign to the President, not merely to President Eisenhower but to any Presidents who may come after him, powers which under the Constitution repose in the Congress? Can we establish in careless haste precedents which may strip the office of the Presidency of power to direct the armed forces as may be necessary in the interests of the United States? Can we share responsibility with the President, as he asks us to do in this Middle Eastern matter, without grasping the full implications of what it is that we are asked to share? Without a conviction that it is a responsibility that we can, in good conscience, share?

The resolution on the Middle East is an interpretation of a critical international situation by the Executive Branch of the government. It is also a remedy advanced by that Branch as to how the situation ought to be met. The Senate knows from past experience that the Executive Branch is no more infallible than the Congress. That Branch can be wrong in its grasp of international developments. It can be wrong in the measures it proposes for dealing with them.

Under a government of separate powers, the orderly processes of the Senate and the Congress as a whole can act to correct possible distortions both in the interpretations and the remedies to which they give rise. In the past, Congress has repeatedly exercised this function of correction. We must continue to exercise it or face frankly the prospect of fundamental changes in our Constitutional system. And we must, if we are to exercise it well, not be driven by the whip of urgency after months of inaction by the Executive Branch, a Branch which presumably was in full possession of the facts.

I appreciate the efforts that the President has made to guide the course of American policy in these dangerous times. He is a man of peace and he has so impressed much of the rest of the world. His intentions are of the best, whether or not they are always fruitful. The Secretary of State, too, has worked tirelessly and selflessly to safeguard the interests of the United States as he sees those interests. With all due respect to both the President and the Secretary of State, however, it seems to me that the need for a constructive contribution to foreign policy from the Senate at this time is very great.

There is a need for the Senate to bring the whole international situation -- not merely the Middle East -- into perspective and to keep it in perspective. To the extent that the Executive Branch should fail to see the realities abroad which confront the nation, then the Senate must try to illuminate these realities. To the extent that we believe foreign policy as advanced by the Executive Branch is inadequate, ineffectual or ill-adapted to the needs of the nation, then it is incumbent upon us to state our beliefs. It is incumbent on us

to dissent. And it is incumbent on us to advise constructive alternatives when we do dissent.

These powers of the Senate in foreign relations are far-reaching powers. They can work great good for the nation or they can work great harm. They should always be exercised with restraint and care. When necessary, however, they must be exercised.

Mr. President, throughout the last session of Congress, I made an effort to keep the international problems which confront the nation and our foreign policies under independent review in the Senate. Other members of the Senate did the same. I recall that the distinguished Senator from Arkansas (Mr. Fulbright) and the able and conscientious minority leader (Mr. Knowland) turned to this subject many times. So, too, did the Senator from Vermont (Mr. Flanders), the Senator from Florida (Mr. Smathers), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. Humphrey), the Senator from Washington (Mr. Jackson), the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Symington), and many others.

During the second session of the 84th Congress, I delivered a series of speeches in the Senate on the international situation and foreign policy. In these remarks, I sought to spell out what I hold to be essential in the relationship between the President and the Congress in carrying on the foreign policy of the nation.

There is, I believe, little that is partisan in these speeches. In any event, their intention was not partisan. They question neither the patriotism nor the motives of the President of the United States and his chief advisors on

foreign policy. They give credit to the Administration where credit was due. They accept the premise of leadership by the President in foreign relations and urge only that he exercise it more clearly and firmly.

There is support for some aspects of the Administration's policies in these speeches. I tried not to oppose merely for the sake of opposition. Where I found it necessary to dissent, I sought to offer constructive alternatives. It is gratifying to note that over the months since I began this series last January some of these alternatives have been incorporated into the understanding and actions of the Executive Branch. I claim no special credit for any of these changes. The impetus for them came from many sources, including other members of this body and the Congress as a whole. I merely point to the fact in order to emphasize that the Senate can make a contribution to the course of American policy by the process of independent review.

I do not know, Mr. President, how often I shall be able to turn to the subject of foreign relations in discussions on the floor during the current session. Before we were much advanced into the legislative schedule for the year, however, I did want to set forth my understanding of what the nation's interests required, beyond party, in the way of responsible cooperation between the President and the Congress in foreign relations.

I also want to set forth at this time my understanding of the current situation abroad and what I believe to be the principal inadequacies of the Administration's policies in meeting that situation.

Mr. President, we are confronted not merely with one difficult situation in the world, that of the Middle East. We are confronted with many and all must be faced. Some of these situations are critical, as is the case in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. Others, dormant for the moment, may become equally critical or more so in the near future. That is true, I believe, of the situation in Western Europe and the Far East. Still others, like that in Latin America, are what I would regard as neglected situations. Finally, there are those areas of the world which represent, in my opinion, improved situations. I would include in this category Southeast Asia and parts of North Africa.

As I have already noted, I have been deeply disturbed by the manner in which the Administration has handled Middle Eastern developments. There were steps recommended months ago which had they been taken might well have prevented the outbreak of the Suez conflict. They were not taken or taken too late. Each delay has acted to increase the dangers in that region and the potential cost of meeting the dangers. In this resolution which the President has sent to us, we now have the cumulative price of inaction, of empty campaign slogans of peace where there was no peace.

It is a heavy price. It may now involve the commitment of American military strength of unforeseen dimensions to the Middle East. It may now involve the beginning of military and economic assistance activities in new and perhaps questionable channels in that region. The Administration does not even guess at the ultimate scope or cost of these activities.

I have never opposed economic or military assistance to other nations if, in my judgment, it held realistic promise of promoting responsible and stable government, peace and international commerce, with consequent benefit to this nation. It is still not clear, however, that the changes in the foreign aid legislation as sought in the President's resolution will serve that purpose. Further, the resolution ignores the immediate difficulties which have upset peace in the Middle East -- the Suez situation and the Arab-Israeli dispute. It may even act to intensify these difficulties.

Speaking for myself, Mr. President, I desire to make clear that I believe action by this government -- cooperative and constructive action by the President and the Congress -- in the Middle Eastern crisis is essential. I want to make equally clear, however, that I do not believe that the proposal presented by the Executive Branch in its original form provided for that kind of action.

Before work on the President's resolution is concluded by the Congress, I hope that we will have acted to make clear the following points:

1. That this country will not stand idly by if there is communist aggression in that area, and that such aggression if it comes, will be met within our Constitutional processes.

2. That this country will sustain with such material aid as may be needed the efforts of the United Nations Emergency Force to maintain the truce in the Middle East.

3. That any new aid programs -- military or economic -- in the Middle East are only stop-gap unless they are related in some manner to easing the economic and political difficulties that have been caused by the Suez dispute, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the other basic problems of the area.

4. That this country will redouble its efforts through the United Nations to curb a principal cause of the intensification of the crisis in the Middle East -- Soviet and other arms traffic. ***

No less critical than developments in the Middle East is the situation in Eastern Europe. The display of courage in Hungary has evoked universal admiration. The growing pressure for freedom in Poland and elsewhere, and even in Russia, has astonished those who with little comprehension of the power of liberty believed that only military force applied from without could shake the grip of tyranny within the Soviet enclave.

It is all very well, Mr. President, to stand on the sidelines and express admiration for the Hungarians and astonishment at the surging forces of freedom in Eastern Europe. It is all very well, Mr. President, to concentrate our attention on the relief of refugees from the terror in Hungary or to present boldly-worded resolutions of condemnation in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

*** I am introducing at this time a joint resolution which I hope will help to clarify these four points. I ask unanimous consent that this Resolution be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Armed Services Committee for such use as it may have in connection with consideration of the President's proposal on the Middle East.

But there are also other implications which emerge from the stirrings in the Soviet empire. There are new challenges which confront us and I trust the Administration will lose no time in meeting them. Our interest with respect to Eastern Europe and even the Soviet Union itself is not merely in the tearing down of tyranny. It is not in the spread of chaos and destruction from which new tyrannies may well emerge, well-fed on the blood of martyrs to freedom.

Our interest with respect to Eastern Europe, our fundamental interest, is in the building up of stable, responsible and humane governments -- peaceful governments -- which can take their rightful place in a peaceful Europe and in a world at peace. This task of building lies preponderantly with the peoples of Eastern Europe and each will bring to it those unique characteristics which are the marks of nationhood.

What we and others do or fail to do in our policies, however, will have an impact on the process. Our policies will hasten or delay the building. That is why I urge the Administration to go beyond the immediate repercussions of the crisis in Eastern Europe. It is time to recognize that we are dealing not only with the monolithic structure of international communism in that region. We are also dealing with a many-sided situation in which old, new and frequently obscure political forces are at work.

It is time to note and to note carefully that political developments in Yugoslavia, Hungary and Poland are following different patterns and that those which are likely to take place in Bulgaria, Rumania and elsewhere may be equally

dissimilar. It is time to find out why. It is time to develop policies which recognize these differences, policies which in each case offer the best hope of the emergence of stable, responsible, humane and peaceful governments. A single policy, a single attitude towards the entire region of Eastern Europe, in my opinion, no longer serves the interests of the United States.

It is time, too, to consult intensively and to cooperate closely with the nations of Western Europe on this matter. Those nations have lived for a long time in more intimate contact with the troubled regions to the east. Tyranny is an old story in that part of the world and the West Europeans are not unfamiliar with it. Their views on this question, as expressed in NATO and elsewhere, warrant our most careful attention.

The concern of the European democracies in the satellite countries of Eastern Europe is more direct and it is deeper than ours. That is the case for many reasons. The most significant, however, is that developments in Eastern Europe are closely linked with the central problem of Western Europe -- the unification of Germany. The time may be rapidly approaching when there will arise the greatest challenge since the end of World War II not only to our foreign policy but to the policies of the nations of Western Europe. That challenge will be to relate the solution of the problem of German unification to the unfolding developments in Eastern Europe in a manner which insures the independence and the tranquillity of all the nations of that tormented continent. When that moment comes, I hope the Administration will be prepared for it and will have the courage to face it. It may be the last chance in this century to insure a lasting peace and the survival of recognizable human civilization on earth.

In anticipation of that moment, this nation must redouble its efforts to encourage a deepening unity in Western Europe. Further, this nation must maintain and strengthen its ties with that region in the interests of common security and common progress.

I do not accept the bland assurances of this Administration that all is right with these ties. The handling of the Middle East crisis has set in motion new impulses of division. These come on top of others which have plagued our relations with Western Europe in recent times. They hasten the process of erosion of unity which has gone on for several years.

It is true that a common revulsion against the Soviet atrocities in Hungary has brought the nations of the Western world once again more closely together. To equate this momentary seeking of sanctuary on common ground with genuine unity, however, to assume that it is evidence that all is right with that unity, borders on the irresponsible.

I have said it many times and I repeat it now: the unity of the Western nations, welded in the agony of two wars, supported at enormous cost by the people of the United States, is in grave danger. If it is to hold, it must be sustained by something more than a common revulsion, by something more than a common fear of Soviet brutality. Unless this unity rests on a mutual appreciation of its vital necessity to each, unless there is a will to cooperation in the solution of common problems and the national forebearance which makes cooperation possible, unless there is inspired leadership towards new goals of common progress -- unless these positive elements are present, the process of

disintegration will go on. In time, if anything at all, only the look of unity will remain in such institutions as the European Union and NATO. These institutions, however, will be devoid of substance.

If there are grave dangers underlying the situation in Western Europe, others are buried in the situation on the other side of the globe, in the Far East. A calm appears to have settled over that region and a silence amounting virtually to censorship has characterized the Administration's handling of developments in that region. We may well ask ourselves, of what is the calm composed? What is the significance of the silence?

The calm, Mr. President, is composed of three tenuous truces -- the truce in Korea, the truce in Formosa and the truce in Indochina. These are truces which act to maintain an unstable status quo in the Far East but they settle nothing. It is this status quo, this calm, this outward calm, this questionable calm that has been presented to the people of the United States as an achievement of peace.

How long will the calm last? Will the urge to unification in Korea, in Indochina, soon put an end to it? What of the continuing threat to Formosa? What is likely to emerge from the vast and churning maw of the communist mainland? What has been achieved in the conversations between the Chinese communist delegate and the President's representative which have gone on for years in Geneva? What will follow the restored relations -- trade and other -- between Japan and the communist mainland? Have these been counterbalanced by tightening ties between Japan and other free nations?

We do not even begin, Mr. President, to have adequate insight into these and other important questions concerning the Far East. Yet, in that region no less than elsewhere and in some ways more, the forces of change are constantly at work. We shall be in a position neither to understand them nor to deal with them if the people of this country are lulled into a false sense of security about the Far East. The need is neither for a seeming calm nor a curtain of silence. The need, in the first instance, is for facts, facts which the Administration alone can supply. It is a need for action based on those facts, action designed to strengthen security and peace as they may be threatened in the Far East, not only for the moment but for years to come.

In Latin America, from which I have recently returned, our relations are still, on the whole, friendly. The Fulbright and other exchange-of-persons programs, technical cooperation, Export-Import Bank loans and other measures have made a great contribution to the building of these relations with the neighboring American Republics. Over the years of the Good Neighbor Policy, a substantial reserve of goodwill was established in the nations to the south.

The reserve, however, is not inexhaustible and in recent years we have used up much of it. Our relations are suffering from neglect and ineptitude in their administration. There is a pressing need for creative leadership in this field, a leadership which will search out in the Organization of the American States and in other ways methods of revitalizing the meaning of Pan-Americanism. What is needed is a broad advance to new ground in the cooperation of the Western hemisphere so that this cooperation will yield greater progress and greater

satisfactions to all the peoples of the Americas. I thought that when this Administration several years ago substituted the term "Good Partner" for "Good Neighbor" we would have that kind of an advance. It has not been forthcoming. We have not formed the partnership and we are in danger of alienating the good neighbors.

Elsewhere in the world, in Southeast Asia, South Asia and Africa, there has been some improvement in the understanding of the Executive Branch both in regard to the realities of these situations and as to the measures of policy for meeting them. I may say that in the case of Indochina, this improvement came only after half the country had fallen to communism and just in time to avoid a disastrous involvement of American armed forces. I have not been in the region of Indochina since 1955, but available reports indicate a remarkable diminution of the communist threat there, notably in Viet Nam.

Continuing improvement in our relations with Southeast Asia and these other so-called underdeveloped areas, however, cannot be taken for granted. These relations require constant and sensitive cultivation if they are to grow to mutual advantage. A key factor in these relations are the aid programs which are now under study by a Committee of the Senate. From personal knowledge of the operation of these programs in Asia, I know that they are in great need of adjustment if they are to help rather than hinder our relations in that part of the world.

Mr. President, in this resume I have touched only on some of the most salient circumstances which confront us in the world. I believe I have said

enough, however, to make clear that in broad perspective the international situation remains essentially as I described it some months ago. It is neither black nor white, but, here, at the beginning of the year 1957, it is many shades of gray.

The actions of each nation and the interactions of all contribute to this total pattern. And beyond these factors are vast forces -- physical, economic, religious and others -- which move the long flow of human history. They push the pendulum of mankind, in its broadest arc, towards universal progress or universal destruction.

The influence which this country or any single country can exert on these transcendental forces is limited. Let us recognize that fact and, in recognizing it, avoid the conceited and dangerous delusion of omnipotent world power.

Because that is the case, let us not conclude that we can or should do nothing. Recognition of the limits of our world influence is not a call to retreat into the non-existent insulation of isolation. It is not a license to ignore the international responsibilities which this generation of Americans must assume if future generations are not to be plagued by our irresponsibility.

Recognition of the limits of our influence, in short, is the first step in the responsible use of that influence. It is a call to wield that influence, as it is expressed in foreign policy, with care, with restraint and with economy.

I do not believe, Mr. President, that we are using the influence of the United States in that fashion when we permit dangerous and largely unnecessary

divisions to disrupt our relations with Western Europe. We are not using our influence wisely when we pursue in the Middle East what appears to be, not a policy of isolation, not a policy of internationalism, but a policy of isolated internationalism.

We are not using it wisely when expensive aid programs begin to work at cross-purposes, as in India and Pakistan. We are not using it wisely when these aid programs tend to produce dependency rather than independence in other countries, when they become the means for irresponsible governments to prolong their irresponsibility to their peoples.

We are not using it wisely when the multiple agencies of the Executive Branch pull in different directions in foreign relations.

We are not using it wisely when public relations is substituted for policymaking.

We are not using it wisely if drift, dodge and delay replace decision.

We are not using it wisely when old policies are persisted in after they have outlived their usefulness.

These are some of the ills of our foreign policy as I see them, Mr. President. They suggest their own remedies. There is a need to restore and to strengthen close working relationships with independent democratic countries abroad, on the basis of mutuality of interest and mutuality of sacrifice. There is a need to complete the various studies of foreign aid now in progress as rapidly as possible and, if I may emphasize the point, to apply the findings of these studies in legislative and administrative action.

There is a desperate need to streamline and coordinate the operations of the numerous departments and agencies engaged in foreign activities. The step is essential not only to provide for a more economical use of available resources but even more important to reduce the damage which the bureaucratic conflicts and idiosyncrasies inflict on our relations with other nations. There is a need throughout the Executive Branch to talk less and to do more.

There is a need to return not only the formulation of foreign policy but its conduct to where it belongs -- to the President and his Secretary of State. There is a need finally to encourage the flow of new blood and new ideas -- some of which I trust will be Democratic -- into foreign policy.

And beyond all else, there is a need for clear, continuous and constructive leadership from the President of the United States -- leadership which will point the way towards peace in a world where there is no peace. Few men, Mr. President, in our history as a nation have ever been in a better position to provide that kind of leadership than Mr. Eisenhower. He begins his second term with a great personal mandate from the people of the United States. He has the confidence of the peoples of many nations, not excluding those in Eastern Europe. He is a Republican but his reputation and much of his achievement were registered under Democratic administrations. Not eligible for reelection, he can raise the office of the Presidency beyond politics. He has, in short, an unparalleled opportunity to perform a great and lasting service to this nation and to the entire world. Let him lead from the generalities of peace which characterized his first administration and his recent inaugural address

to the realities of peace in this, his second administration. If he does so lead, he will not lack for responsible cooperation from the Democratic majority in Congress.

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